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Introduction 
 
 
The growing support to the view that political and institutional settings have a role to play 
ensuring fiscal performance has paradoxically been accompanied by an increasing lack of 
confidence about the results achieved. It could be possible that budgetary institutions are 
endogenous, and their apparent efficiency finally depends on the fiscal preferences of voters 
and politicians that enact them. We propose a measure of fiscal preferences based on cantonal 
voters' behavior regarding federal referenda with fiscal content between 1979 and 1998. The 
empirical model shows that fiscal preferences have a strong inverse effect on fiscal 
performance: the more a canton is fiscal conservative, the less it accepts deficits, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
Political and Budgetary Institutions and Fiscal Performance 
Fiscal evolution of the OECD countries has been quite disparate since the seventies although 
the economic evolution is rather similar among these countries. Consequently, an important 
amount of literature has emerged these last years aiming at identifying which are the key 
political and institutional variables added to the standard economic and social variables that 
lead to a better explanation of the different fiscal behavior of industrialized countries. The 
theoretical models and the empirical results are well established, and they are usually built up 
using the tools offered by the Positive Political Economics of Deficits. Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1998) propose a comprehensive review of the state of the 
question, advancing the main theories and the empirical results. Poterba (1996a), Krol (1997), 
von Hagen (1998) and Pujol (1999) focus more specifically on the literature concerning the 
impact of formal budgetary constraints. Empirical evidence suggests that the political 
configuration can influence the fiscal performance (i.e. minority governments, coalitions 
governments and in some cases left-wing governments are related with more deficits, ceteris 
paribus, while direct democracy reinforces debt control). Also, budgetary engineering seems 
to influence the final fiscal imbalances (negotiations dominated by the prime minister or the 
minister of finance are related with less indebtedness, and the same occurs if the executive 
body controls the budgetary process over the legislative branch. As expected, empirical 
evidence shows that the more a formal rule is stringent against debt financing, the less the 
level of deficits.).  
Can Budgetary Institutions be Considered Exogenous? 
The growing support to the view that political and institutional settings have a role to play 
ensuring fiscal performance has paradoxically been accompanied by an increasing lack of 
confidence about the results achieved. Apparently, political institutions and budgetary 
institutions seem to be crucial for fiscal discipline. But, if certain institutions are more 
favorable to fiscal discipline, it would be possible that these mechanisms have been adopted 
because voters or politicians in this collectivity are more conservative against debt financing 
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 that in others collectivities with more "debt-friendly" settings. Poterba is, to our knowledge, 
the first author to raise this potential misspecification of the models, pointing out the problem 
in a very clear way: "The critical question for policy evaluation is how to interpret this 
correlation between budget institutions and fiscal-policy outcomes. It is possible that the 
correlation simply reflects correlation involving fiscal discipline, fiscal institutions, and an 
omitted third variable, voter tastes for fiscal restraint. Voters in some jurisdictions may be less 
inclined to borrow to support current state outlays or to use deficits to shift the burden of 
paying for current state programs to the future. If these voters are also more likely to support 
the legislative or constitutional limits on deficit finance, then the observed link between fiscal 
rules and fiscal policy could be spurious" (Poterba 1996b, p. 399). If it was the case, public or 
political preferences could become at the end a main factor explaining the comparative 
evolution of debt. The argument could be presented in the following simplified way. Let us 
call "A" the voters' preferences for fiscal restraint, "B" the budgetary or fiscal rules or 
institutions and "C" the fiscal policy outcome. The possible sequences of argument are : 
C=f(B), in this case preferences have no influence; C=f(A), fiscal institutions play no role; 
and C=f(A,B), both are simultaneously important. The observed correlation - thus Poterba - 
could appear as C=f(B) formally, but in fact reflect either C=f(A) or C=f(A,B). 
Which attitude has been adopted among the specialists of political economics of debt after 
Porteba's question has been raised? The scope of answers is rather large. A first group of 
economists, even considering the potential influence of preferences (that is C=f(A,B)) , prefer 
to consider institutions as if they were completely exogenous, renouncing to any attempt to 
introduce in the model some kind of variable that catches the notion of fiscal conservatism 
(C=f(A)). That is the choice taken by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), or Stein, Talvi and 
Grisanti (1998). 
Other authors have tried to theoretically evaluate the potential impact of fiscal conservatism 
on fiscal performance. These economists often arrive to the (theoretical) conclusion that fiscal 
preferences have great chances to imply a minor impact on empirical results (again, C=f(A)). 
Von Hagen and Harden (1994) argue that, as the institutional framework was similar among 
industrialized countries in the 1960s, this setting gives the opportunity to estimate the direct 
influence of preferences on debt control. But, as Von Hagen and Harden observe, the budget 
outcomes were comparable among the mentioned group of countries. Since then, the authors 
conclude the limited impact on preferences. Nevertheless, it is possible to justify the second 
part of the alternative, ignored by von Hagen and Harden. Indeed, perhaps at that time, fiscal 
preferences were homogeneous among countries. Furthermore, even if preferences were 
different among countries, this fact did not imply differential fiscal outcomes at that time, as 
the 1960 were years of continuos and stable economic growth, without major economic 
shocks. 
Another argument presented to weaken the link between preferences and debt is that debt 
constraints at the level of USA States had been adopted many years ago, even in the last 
century. It would be hard to assume that preferences have remained unchanged since this 
period for each singular State. It would be then reasonable to consider the budgetary rules as 
exogenous variables (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1995, Poterba 1996a, Alesina and Perotti 
1997). But, even accepting the existence of a shortage between preferences and institutions, 
the stability of rules does not necessarily imply that they are independent from preferences. 
As GAO (1985) and NASBO (1992) suggest, past decisions and choices can produce a 
tradition in the fiscal behavior, formal restrictions contributing to mould this inheritance. The 
notion of tradition introduces a more complex relationship between institutions and 
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 preferences, but this fact would nevertheless confirm the specific effect of preferences. 
Otherwise, any useful fiscal rule for a given collectivity could be applied in another one and a 
similar pro-discipline effect would automatically be expected. 
Poterba (1994) has tried to avoid the problem of endogeneity analyzing the effects of fiscal 
rules in the short term, assuming that in this case, one can expect that even if existing, 
different fiscal preferences have less impact in the short term reaction to budget imbalances. 
We think that, even if Poterba is surely right assuming that fiscal conservatism has a lesser 
impact in this case, the same argument than above can be repeated. If preferences do not play 
a real role, short-term-effect performing rules could be adopted anywhere, and produce 
similar effects automatically the day after being introduced. It could be the case, but it would 
be better to estimate the effect of preferences when short-term rules are applied, to confirm or 
invalidate this hypothesis. 
Because these attempts to minimize the eventual impact of preferences are not fully 
satisfactory, other economists use variables that are supposed to catch the complex notion of 
"preferences on debt". The first attempt done in this direction was logically to take into 
account the political affiliation of executive or legislative power. That is the solution retained 
by Holtz-Eakin (1988) and Poterba (1995). But, as Bohn and Inman (1996) remark, this is a 
too much crude notion of preferences.  
Another possibility tempted is to consider fiscal conservatism as a dummy variable that 
becomes active for countries or collectivities that are reputed to be fiscal conservatives and 
null otherwise. Bohn and Inman (1996) adopt this choice and define the States of the South of 
the USA as being conservatives. They obtain the sign of the relation predicted, i. e., the South 
States have a lower burden of debt. Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) obtain the opposite result. 
The main caveat of this approach is that fiscal conservatism is not captured from a measurable 
social or political variable, but only on the ground of the researcher's intuition, supposing to 
follow a "general agreed feeling". 
Bohn and Inman (1996) had gone a step further in their effort to tackle fiscal preferences 
using the CBS/New York Times opinion poll that indicates the percentage of voters that 
themselves identify as conservatives (for the period 1976-1988). This variable seems to have 
little impact on debt and the introduction of this latest variable does not modify the results 
obtained before regarding the effectiveness of certain formal debt constraints. Even if this 
measure of conservatism is better that the other used before, we feel that it does not capture 
the state of preferences quite well enough. The pertinent measure of conservatism for our 
issue ought to be directly related to the notion of fiscal conservatism which is different from 
the general notion of political conservatism. Also, ideally, a pertinent measure of fiscal 
preferences would need to be directly linked to actual budgetary choices, rather than being 
solely a theoretical engagement for or against fiscal conservatism. 
Rueben (1995) shows that, in the near field of constraints in expenditures growth, if 
preferences are taken into account (measured here by the presence of referendum) empirical 
results changes dramatically. A positive correlation appears between constraints and 
expenditure control, when the initial model without preferences did not show such a 
relationship.  
Considering all these attempts we strongly support the need to take into account preferences 
in the models. It is important to point out in addition that preferences not only can play a 
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 major role in better explaining the specific effects of budgetary institutions, but also can help 
to explain different fiscal behavior between collectivities ceteris paribus, that is, 
independently of the nature of existing budgetary processes and constraints.  
Measuring Swiss Cantonal Preferences on Debt 
Switzerland counts two institutional characteristics that, added, allow us to propose an index 
of cantonal fiscal conservatism. The first necessary condition for our objective is the 
existence of fiscal federalism. Each of the twenty-six cantons, that is the second layer of 
government in Switzerland, has its own range of public policies competencies and disposes of 
its own fiscal resources to fulfil these tasks. Cantons benefit from a broad degree of budgetary 
freedom, reflected in the differences among them concerning the size of the public sector in 
the economy, the range and the importance of each policy inside the budget and the choice 
among different taxes and the global level of the fiscal burden (Dafflon 1999). The small 
dimension of each canton and the openness of their economies reduce dramatically the 
economic meaning of a fiscal policy at under-national level (Rosen 1992, Weber 1997), but 
even in this framework it is possible to imagine different budgetary reactions to business 
cycles. 
As a consequence, the extent of debt financing varies strongly among cantons, as it is 
reflected in Graph 1. We have chosen the total amount of borrowing requirement assumed by 
each canton between 1979 and 1996. The borrowing requirement is defined (ignoring internal 
imputations) as the sum of current expenditures (without amortization) plus the net costs of 
new investments less the revenues form the current account (variable DEFCUM thereafter). 
We retain in this article the notion of borrowing requirement because it gives a good 
indication of the public choices taken by politicians, disregarding the nature of the 
expenditure financed (current or capital outlays). Doing this we follow the choice adopted by 
Natal (1997) and Lambelet (1998). Another clear advantage of this measure of fiscal 
imbalance is that it offers homogeneous data for all the Swiss cantons that covers the entire 
interval chosen, contrarily to the other measures. To simplify, we will often simply speak 
about debt or deficits instead of borrowing requirement, but having in mind that we are 
thinking about this latter term. 
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 Graph 1 
Borrowing Requirement between 1979 and 1996, in francs per inhabitant
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The second institutional characteristic that enables us to build up an index of fiscal 
preferences is the existence of popular referendum,  a democratic tool that is employed at all 
three political layers in Switzerland. Swiss citizens have to vote on all kind of subjects, 
typically these lasts decades two to four times a year, and normally concerning several 
independent federal, cantonal and local issues at each consultation. 
We propose an index of cantonal fiscal preferences based on the level of acceptance of 
objects submitted to referendum reflecting voters' fiscal conservatism ("rigorisme 
budgétaire"). As we choose federal objects submitted to referendum, we dispose of the level 
of acceptance/refusal of each canton for the very same issue. That constitutes for us the main 
advantage of the index, that cannot be provided when using the responses of people to 
cantonal referenda on budgetary affairs : it is impossible to find subjects voted that are strictly 
comparable. By contrast, at the federal level, each single person decides on the same issue all 
across the Swiss territory, ignoring the decision made by the other cantons at the time of vote. 
What do we understand by "fiscal conservatism" has to be clarified before moving forward. A 
conservative fiscal behavior will be determined in our model on the basis of the following 
assertions.  
a) The aggregate choice of a given canton will be considered more conservative than that 
from another canton if it has a higher rate of acceptance of the following measures : 
• The introduction of a new tax or raising existing ones; 
• The suppression of an existing grant or other public expenditures; 
• The adoption of rules to control the expenditure growth, deficit limits, and combined 
measures searching deficit reduction as primary goal. 
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 b) The aggregate choice of a given canton will be considered more conservative than that 
from another canton if the more conservative one has a lower rate of acceptance of the 
following measures : 
• Tax reduction; 
• The adoption of new expenditures or public policies when this measure is not explicitly 
accompanied with an introduction of new taxes or the increasing of existing ones. 
We exclude for the construction of our index of fiscal preferences the objects submitted to 
referendum that propose at the same time a new expenditure accompanied by a new source of 
revenues to finance it. The referenda on these kind of subjects reflect more a preference on 
individual policy and the size of the public sector rather than an expression of the degree of 
fiscal conservatism. 
Having this criteria in mind, we have analyzed each voting since 1979, selecting those that 
seem to fit one of the criteria proposed. Table 5 in annex II presents the main information of 
each one of the objects that we have retained, that is, 75 different voting from February 1979 
to September 1998. This period was chosen because in 1978 Jura became the 26th canton of 
the Swiss Confederation, seceding from its elderly dependence to the Canton of Bern. During 
this period, a total amount of 156 were been submitted to federal referendum. 
A wide scope of subjects fall under our selection, as it appears in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Fiscal issues submitted to referendum between 1979 and  
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 1998 
     
 Conservative voting Number of voting  
 More Taxes General 297, 308, 312, 371, 398, 399,  
  Transportation 316, 317, 343, 351, 405, 406, 
407, 442 
 
  Finance 302, 331, 389,  
  Specific 303, 312, 324, 332, 401  
     
 Less 
Expenditures 
Army 346, 393, 427  
     
 Less Grants Agriculture 304, 333, 413, 428, 446  
  Education 326, 328  
  Social Security 325, 327, 373, 397, 422, 437  
  Transportation 429  
  Economy 436  
     
 Fiscal 
Adjustment 
 400, 421, 439  
     
 Laxists voting  Number of voting  
 Less Taxes  384  
     
 More Expend Social security 305, 323, 350, 352, 415, 416, 
423, 444 
 
  Culture, 
Education 
339, 340, 410, 425  
  Transportation 347, 368, 370, 382  
  Environment, 
Energy 
294, 313, 349, 367, 377, 381  
  Administration 386, 387, 431  
     
 More Grants Economy 335  
  Agriculture 341, 356, 363, 418, 430  
  Housing 342  
     
 
After having chosen the pertinent voting, we arrange the cantons applying the criteria of 
conservatism proposed above. We have normalized the percentage of yes/no votes of each 
canton, giving to the Swiss mean the value 50. This transformation allow us to give the same 
weight to each one of the 75 voting, independently of the mean degree of acceptance for each 
one of them. Importantly, the normalization that we have introduced conserves the difference 
of intensity of vote inside a given voting and among all voting. We propose an aggregate 
value of relative fiscal preferences of each canton by simply computing the arithmetic mean 
of the 75 single values obtained by each canton.2 Graph 2 below shows the index of fiscal 
preferences of the 26 Swiss cantons for the period 1979 to 1998, defined as RIGUEUR. 
 60 
 Graph 2 
Index of Fiscal Convervatism RIGUEUR75 (1979-1998)
30
35
40
45
50
55
  J
ur
a
  G
en
èv
e
  N
eu
ch
ât
el
  V
al
ai
s
  V
au
d
  F
rib
ou
rg
  T
es
si
n
  S
ol
eu
re
  S
ch
af
fh
ou
se
  S
ch
w
yt
z
  B
âl
e-
Vi
lle
  B
âl
e-
C
am
pa
gn
e
  A
rg
ov
ie
  L
uc
er
ne
  B
er
ne
  O
bw
al
d
  G
ris
on
s
  T
hu
rg
ov
ie
  U
ri
  Z
ou
g
  N
id
w
al
d
  Z
ur
ic
h
  S
t-G
al
l
  A
pp
en
ze
ll 
R
hE
xt
.
  G
la
ris
  A
pp
en
ze
ll 
R
hI
nt
.
 
The interpretation of our main aggregate index of fiscal conservatism, RIGUEUR presented 
in the Graph 2, is analogous to the score given for a singular voting.3 If a canton is 
systematically over the Swiss mean degree of acceptance of fiscal measures submitted to 
referendum between 1979 and 1998, it would have a final score greater than 50, and lower 
than 50 otherwise.4  
In that way, we consider to propose a fairly accurate “ revelator ” of budgetary preferences 
whom influence on fiscal performance can be tested in empirical models. At the same time, 
we find some caveats that can not be ignored, even if we think that these limitations do not 
give away the utility and pertinence of our measures of fiscal conservatism. 
• Remember that we look for cantonal fiscal preferences. We have obtained ours analyzing 
federal referenda. That is logically a source of limitations. First of all, the final evaluation 
of the index depends on the objects submitted to vote. Some of them belong typically to 
the federal sphere of competencies that are not shared by the cantons. Conversely, other 
issues that play a significant role in cantonal budgets are almost ignored at federal level. It 
could be argued then that fiscal preferences that affect the cantonal budgetary issues are 
not captured quite well enough. 
• The economic, social or demographic characteristics of each canton can influence the 
response for specific domains. If among the objects selected for the elaboration of each one 
of our indexes, specific political issues are over-presented, they can produce a bias 
towards/against the true level of conservatism for a certain group of common cantons. 
Considering that having 75 different objects for the main index cover a wide extent of 
policies, this eventual distortion has not to be exaggerated. 
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 • The index of fiscal conservatism is measured by the popular will. It would be better to 
have an index directly linked to politician preferences, as they establish finally the 
budgetary choices. With our proposition we assume implicitly that politicians choices 
follow voters preferences. In fact, this hypothesis, often adopted in similar studies referring 
to the median voter model or other theoretical presentations, can be accepted with 
confidence for the Swiss case precisely because of the presence of semi-direct democracy 
not only at federal level but also at cantonal and communal level. 
• The index of fiscal conservatism changes in time for each canton and we have chosen a 
synthetic value that covers all the period. We introduce thus the hypothesis that 
preferences are stable at mean-term. In fact, if we introduce for instance the Holdrik-
Prescott filter for these individual temporal series we observe that for some cantons the 
value taken in 1979 differs substantially from values given inside the period or at the final 
stage, in 1998. Even if it would be worthwhile to go further into the detail of the evolution 
of cantonal preferences in time, we renounce to do this in this article, as we discuss further 
in point 4, endnote 7. 
 
The Econometric Model 
Evaluating the impact of cantonal preferences on fiscal performance, we consider that the 
pertinent exogenous budgetary variable to take into account is the total borrowing 
requirement assumed by each canton during the period 1979 to 1996 as defined at the 
beginning of point 3. This measure is preferred to total gross or net cantonal debt because we 
are trying to identify the specific influence of budgetary preferences. We assume that 
borrowing requirement depends on political choices based largely on the economic and social 
facts inside the period 1979-1996 and, of course, on the fiscal preferences prevailing during 
this period. By contrast, the total amount of cantonal debt (gross or net) depends also of 
changes in the patrimonial assets of a particular canton and of budgetary choices done before 
1979 that, logically, depend themselves of past economic and social framework, together with 
past preferences on debt, and it is possible that they differ from those calculated for the 
interval 1979-1998. 
The explanatory variables. 
We propose a somehow comprehensive model that takes into account the most relevant 
variables - at least to our point of view - following the way opened by other authors on the 
political economics of debt. As the size of our sample is not so big (26 cantonal states) we 
have to be careful choosing the explanatory variables, limiting the degrees of freedom to the 
lesser extent and retaining for each group only those that we consider more theoretically 
valuable. We have considered five group of variables : i) economic; ii) structural 
characteristics defining each canton; iii) political variables; iv) budgetary variables; v) the 
measure of fiscal preferences. Table 4 in annex II presents the main information about each 
variable. Let us present each one in a certain detail. 
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 i) Economic variables.  
We have selected the mean level between the first and the latest year of cantonal revenue, 
measured in Swiss francs per inhabitant (REVENU). It can be asserted that the more the 
economic wealth of the canton, the more it will be able to assume larger nominal deficits per 
inhabitant, if we consider that people measure the burden of public debt in relative term rather 
than in absolute term. 
We have also selected the rate of economic growth (CROISS) for each canton. Even if the 
cantons are not expected to play an active counter-cyclical debt policy because of the 
inefficiency of such a choice at local level, it is evident that economic performance has an 
impact on cantonal fiscal balance. The business cycle automatically affects the budget 
through the built-up stabilizers. But, as we propose a simple cross-section model, we ought to 
provide a synthetic measure covering the entire period under analysis (1979-1996). We 
consider that the best approximation of the effects of business cycles is the annual nominal 
economic growth rate for each canton. Since the values of the evolution of prices for each 
canton do not exist, we assume that they have evolved in a similar path. In any case, nominal 
growth is coherent with the measure of deficits, evaluated also in nominal terms. 
The last economic variable selected is the level of gross debt existing at the beginning of the 
period (DETTEINI), measured in francs per inhabitant. Two opposite phenomena can affect 
the relation of this last variable with the debt accumulated afterwards. On the one hand, the 
more the burden of initial debt, the more a canton will spend in the future to pay for interests 
and thus, the more a canton will be indebted consecutively compared to another with a lower 
initial debt. On the other hand, the more the initial indebtedness, the more stringent will be 
the fiscal adjustments to maintain a manageable level of debt.  
We ignore two other economic variables. First, the level of cantonal unemployment, because 
it is less interesting that the variable CROISS for three reasons. The level of unemployment is 
almost null in all cantons during the 1980 and it increases to a peak 6 to 8 percent for certain 
cantons after 1993, having then a limited impact on the budget. Secondly, unemployment 
indemnities are mainly financed at federal level. And finally, the diminution of fiscal 
revenues consecutive to unemployment is indirectly caught by the variable CROISS. The 
other economic variable ignored is the level of cantonal fiscal burden, as it can be considered 
largely endogenous, depending on the variable REVENU. Also, as the level of public 
expenditures is strongly correlated with the level of initial debt, we have preferred the latter 
one, as it is more consistent for the model.  
ii) Structural variables show the economic and institutional factors that can influence the 
budgetary outcomes. They are rather stable cantonal characteristics but vary strongly among 
the cantons. We have selected four of them. The part of revenues coming from the 
Confederation funds (CH) is the first structural variable retained. The origin of these revenues 
coming from the central government is multiple, ranging from reimbursement of the cantonal 
share of taxes raised at federal level, to equalizing funds or grants. The assumption advanced 
by some authors (Natal 1997, Von Ungern-Sternberg 1998) is that the highest this percentage, 
the less a canton will recur to debt financing.  
The second variable is the proportion of cantonal and communal expenditures that is assumed 
by the cantonal budget (PARTCANT). It has been often argued (see for instance Natal 1997) 
that the highest the percentage of expenditures supported by one canton the higher will be its 
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 deficits. One explanation is simply that if, for a given period, cantons and communes close the 
exercise with deficits (as is has been the case during the 1990s), a canton assuming a higher 
part of the total outlays will logically support a larger deficit. Another argument is given in 
term of the relative power between the cantons and the communes. As communal leaders are 
well represented in the cantonal parliament, the canton cannot easily impose new burdens to 
communes and thus, cantonal budget is relatively penalized.  
AGRICULT is a third structural variable. It measures the percentage of cantonal income 
produced by the primary sector. This variable tries to catch the relative strength of the 
agricultural sector in the economy and in the cantonal life. It is commonly agreed that the so-
called "rural cantons" have specific political and social behaviors, though it is hazardous to 
establish theoretically in which direction this characteristic is linked with deficits. One 
possible argument is that peasant people are considered to be traditionally less confident 
regarding the role and the activities of the State and, thus, could be less prone to accept public 
expenditures or the use of debt financing. In this case, the variable would be negatively 
correlated. On the other hand, since agriculture is highly subsidized by the center, one could 
fear that restriction rules in general at the center will be pervasive and touch their own 
interest. Simultaneously, it is known that taxation burden in this sector is well below average 
in almost all the cantons. In that case, the variables could be positively correlated. 
The fourth structural variable reflects the structure of ages in the canton (AGING), and is 
measured by the percentage of resident people being 65 and older. This variable measures the 
so much debated bequest effect. One of the necessary conditions for the principle of neutrality 
of debt advanced by Barro (1974) is that agents behave following an infinite horizon plan. For 
this to be the case, the solidarity between generations ought to be ensured : the old people 
refuse to take advantage of debt financing to preserve the descendants' wealth. If it was not 
the case, as it has been often stated, a positive relationship would appear between the 
percentage of aging people and the amount of deficits.   
The last variable retained is PARTVILLES, the percentage of people living in towns of more 
than 10,000 inhabitants. The expected relationship between this variable and the amount of 
debt is positive, as cities concentration requires more public services solutions. It is also often 
argued that the greater the size of the collectivity, the lesser the strength of fiscal discipline, as 
the subjective distance between the citizen and the government tends to be higher. Remark 
that this notion is not exactly the same as that measured by AGRICULT, although they are 
logically negatively correlated. 
iii) We have chosen two political variables. The first one for the party affiliation at the 
executive branch, DROITE, defined as the percentage of seats occupied by center-right 
parties, accordingly to the criterion followed by the Annuaire statistique de la Suisse. We 
select right parties percentage because all the cantons observed for all the legislatures 
between 1979 and 1998 have been dominated by right-wing coalitions. We expect that the 
higher the percentage, the less the level of debt, remembering nevertheless that no clear 
empirical evidence has been attained concerning this relationship. This link could be even less 
clear in the Swiss framework, as cantonal governance is more in the collegial consensus style 
rather than in right-left opposition, so that the right-left spectrum is not very large. 
The second political variable is the mean number of parties governing the cantonal executive 
branches, COALITION. We think that in the Swiss framework, a weak government is more a 
minority government (Edin and Ohlsson 1991) rather than a coalition government (Roubini 
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 and Sachs 1989). In fact, it cannot be excluded a positive relationship between the number of 
parties and fiscal performance because the existence of cantonal referenda demands large 
coalitions to ensure the acceptance of political decisions.  
iv) As budgetary variables we choose a dummy variable for the presence of cantonal 
compulsory referenda for new public expenditures exceeding a given amount fixed by law, 
REFEREN. Even if this measure has as primary goal the control of expenditures growth, it 
can be argued that cantons counting with fiscal referendum will limit the financing of public 
outlays by borrowing.  
We have renounced to include a variable for the presence of formal constraints referring 
explicitly to current deficits, as we find that all not cantons have such an instrument for the 
entire period 1979-1996. In addition, for those cantons with legal constraints, the various 
elements that enter this constraint need much more detailed elaboration to provide an accurate 
measure. We have nevertheless built-up a dummy variable REGLES containing this 
information for three canton with well-established stringent constraints for the entire period 
(Fribourg, the Grisons and Saint-Gall). Even if the coefficient obtained in the regression is 
negatively correlated with the amount of deficits, this relationship is no strong enough to be 
statistically significant. The other coefficients are no effected with or without REGLES. 
v) As measure of fiscal conservatism we choose, of course, the index RIGUEUR.  
We regress the index of fiscal conservatism following the econometric technique of weighted 
least squares (WLS), to take into account the eventual heteroskedasticity of errors, a likely 
hypothesis in the case of cross-section analysis with heterogeneous observations. As usually 
done, we transform the original values normalizing them by the size of the sample. In our 
case, we choose the number of inhabitants per canton, that varies widely among cantons (Feld 
and Kirchgässner 1997 adopt the same solution). We present two variable transformations. 
First, the square root of the number of inhabitants, if we assume that the relationship between 
errors and size is linear (column 1 in table 2). The second transformation uses simply the 
number of inhabitants per canton, and that implies an exponential relationship between size of 
the sample and errors (column 3 in table 2). We have also estimated the model once more 
following the same econometric technique, but regressing only against the variables that 
shown statistical relation with borrowing requirement in the original global model (column 2 
and 4 in the table 1). In general, as expected, the level of significance of the remaining 
variables is increased.5 
 
Results 
Table 2 presents the regression of the borrowing requirement during the period 1979-1996. 
We identify the following main results: 
a) Four to five variables out of twelve show a statistically significant relation with the level of 
indebtedness depending on the model chosen. 
b) The variable of fiscal preferences RIGUEUR seems to have a clear impact on cantonal 
deficits. The more the cantons are rigorist as referenda voters, the less the extent of borrowing 
requirement, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, it is a variable which is statistically significant at a 
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 level of confidence of 1 % in three of the four regressions proposed. This result suggests a 
certain robustness of the relationship between debt and preferences. 
c) Two other variables are always statistically significant. One economic variable follows the 
expected behavior. The level of economic growth (CROISS) is associated with fewer cantonal 
debt. One structural variable enters also in this category. The more the percentage of people 
living in towns (PARTVILLE), the higher the amount of debt, also as theoretically predicted. 
Table 2 : Estimation of cantonal borrowing requirement (DEFCUM) 
WLS (POPRAC) WLS (POP)
  Global 
Model 
Coefficie
nt
 Reduced 
Model 
Coeffici
ent
 Global 
Model 
Coefficie
nt
 Reduced 
Model 
Coeffici
ent
 
C 38165.17 *** 26989.6 ** 51846.15 *** 34128.9 ***
 (3.381)  (4.604)  (4.899)  (7.468)  
         
REVENU 0.14941    0.25141    
 (0.894)    (1.112)    
         
CROISS -3619.11 ** -2497.22 ** -3586.05 *** - *** 
 (-2.749)  (-2.522)  (-3.007)  (-4.716)  
         
DETTEIN -0.16186    0.05707    
 (-0.445)    (0.120)    
         
CH  -120.049    -203.054 * - ** 
 (-1.182)    (-1.924)  (-2.634)  
         
AGRICUL 565.731 * 250.123  628.875 ** 491.320 *** 
 (2.099)  (1.392)  (2.507)  (3.342)  
         
PARTCA -8.01180    -105.128    
 (-0.088)    (-0.939)    
         
AGING 60.5969    155.904    
 (0.193)    (0.530)    
         
PARTVIL 93.9863 ** 131.399 ** 90.9878 ** 128.503 *** 
 (2.365)  (6.634)  (2.401)  (8.229)  
         
DROITE -6.68229    -25.3548    
 (-0.101)    (-0.419)    
         
COALITI 15.0287    -1184.10    
 (0.015)    (-1.091)    
         
REFEREN 188.007    393.908    
 (0.181)    (0.395)    
         
RIGUEUR -535.198 ** 380.340 ** -652.781 *** - *** 
 (-2.686)  (-3.278)  (-3.615)  (-5.083)  
         
 
Notes : In parentheses, the t-student values. * for statistical significance at 10 % level of 
confidence; ** for statistical significance at 5 % level of confidence; *** for statistical 
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 significance at 1 % level of confidence. Adjusted R2 values do not give the standard notion of 
fitness of the model, as the constant of the model disappear after the variable transformation. 
The adjusted R2 of the OLS model are, respectively : 0.554; 0.619; 0.554; 0.607.  
 
d) Two variables are significant depending on the econometric model chosen. As expected, 
the percentage of cantonal revenues coming from the central government (CH) is negatively 
related with debt, but this relationship is only statistically significant when the weight selected 
is POP. Finally the more rural the canton (AGRICULT), the more it tends to cover 
expenditures by loans. As we pointed out above, it was no clear for us a priori which could be 
the sign of the relation, and the statistics give us positive correlation surprisingly high, even if 
in the reduced model using POPRAC this correlation is not significant. Thus, the second 
hypothesis seems to prevail, that is, rural cantons obtain lower-than-average fiscal yield; to 
ensure public services at federal standards, these cantons are obliged to find a higher external 
financing. This hypothesis needs further investigation. 
e) The other variables seem not to be statistically linked with budgetary performance, based in 
our results. The relation between the level of the cantonal income (REVENU) and the amount 
of deficits is positive as predicted, but not stronger enough to be statistically significant. The 
relation with the initial amount of debt (DETTEINI) is not significant at all. This result 
invalidates the views of some people for whom present deficits are largely determined 
because of the burden of past debt. Surprisingly, the distribution of competence between 
cantons and communes (PARTCANT) seems not to have a determinant impact on debt. Also, 
even if, as expected, the more the elderly people living in the canton (AGING), the larger the 
amount of deficits, this relation is too much weak to be significant. Regarding the political 
variables, the left-right distribution of power in the cantonal governments (DROITE) and the 
number of parties in the executive branch (COALITIONS) appear not to have any influence 
on the level of debt. More intriguing, the budgetary rules are not systematically linked with 
budgetary performance. Compulsory fiscal cantonal referenda seems no to have real effect on 
debt, contrarily to the results of Feld and Kirchgässner (1997)6 who found negative relation. 
We think that perhaps this variable is more linked with the size of the public sector, rather 
than with fiscal imbalances. In fact, we find cantons among the heaviest debt burdened having 
the fiscal referendum (Jura, Neuchâtel, Zürich or Lucerne), when at the same time, other 
cantons with practically no new debt have not this mechanism (Argovie, Basel Land, Tessin, 
Zug). Note that we cannot test directly the influence of preferences on the effectiveness of 
budgetary rules as the latter seem in our model not to have a systematic positive relation with 
fiscal performance, even if we estimate our model without the variable RIGUEUR. Further 
investigation along this line is needed. 
 
Conclusions 
The empirical results suggest that fiscal preferences have a real impact on fiscal performance. 
We are then tempted to reject the hypothesis of some authors who argue that preferences can 
be considered as innocuous, and thus can be ignored in the empirical models. The exceptional 
Swiss institutional setting has enabled us to provide an index of cantonal fiscal conservatism 
that seem to be a good “ detector ” of citizen preferences, even after taking into account some 
eventual caveats. If our empirical results confirm the interest to introduce this kind of variable 
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 in the empirical models, the disappointing element is that the index we have proposed cannot 
be easily replicated outside the Swiss framework, as we do not find the system of federal 
referenda anywhere. It can be imagined that a modified version of our index could be found 
and applied. In any case, these results confirm the need to find an accurate index of fiscal 
preferences, in any form it would take. Further studies, such as Pujol (1998) and Imbeau 
(1999) are needed to provide a general method to discern political preferences on public 
deficits   
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Notes 
1 Previous versions of this article were presented at the 11th Annual Conference on Public 
Budgeting and Financial Management, Washington, October 8, 1999 and the 56th Congress of 
the International Institute for Public Finance, Seville, Spain, August 28-31, 2000. Our 
acknowledgement to people who have provided helpful comments and suggestions : Luc 
Weber, Yves Flückiger, Nicolas Wallart, Alain Schoenenberger, Jaya Krishnakumar, the 
participants of the Seminar of the Department of Economics at the University of Geneva and 
the participants of the 4th Nordic Conference on the Economics of Local Government, Lund 
University, June 4, 1999, specially to Hannu Laurila, James E. Alt and Fredrik Carlsen. 
 
2 Formally, if Yti is the original percentage of yes of the canton i for the referendum object t, 
the value Zti that we will obtain in our calculations is defined as : 
Zti = Yti/Yi*50, being Yi the percentage of yes at the Swiss level for the object i. 
The value of fiscal preferences for each canton during the period 1979 to 1998 is simply 
Zi = ΣZti/n, for t = 1 to 75 and n = 75 
 
3 We have calculated other 5 derived indexes from RIGUEUR to take into consideration two 
facts. i) Referenda can have a different legal source (compulsory referendum; facultative 
referendum or popular initiative) and this could influence voters' behavior.  ii) Some of the 
objects we have selected are submitted to referendum the same day with other fiscal objects. 
The response to several one-day voting tend to be more homogeneous than otherwise. We 
have then calculated a second series of indexes giving only one value per day of voting.  
Taking these into account does not modify the basic result obtained with RIGUEUR. For this 
reason, only the latter is presented here. 
 
4 We test for the equality of means between series, applying ANOVA statistics, and the null 
hypothesis has to be rejected at a level of confidence of 1 % (F-statistic value of 12,24). That 
implies that we cannot consider that the individual values of the whole example are 
statistically equal to the Swiss mean of 50. 
 
5 Another natural alternative econometric model in a cross-section sample with time-series is 
the panel data analysis. We have run panel data regressions using Pooled Least Squares and 
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 GLS method introducing Cross Section Weights. The measure of fiscal preferences 
RIGUEUR appears to be negatively correlated with the value of annual deficits. We find 
nevertheless severe difficulties to deal with our main variable, RIGUEUR, in a time variant 
framework. Thus, we present the methodological discussion and the econometric results in 
Annex II. 
 
6 Feld and Kirchgässner (1997) utilized a more broad notion of "direct democracy" opposed to 
the notion of "representative democracy". Remark also that the results were obtained 
concerning the Swiss local level. Since then, results are not directly comparable. 
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Annex I. Estimation of Cantonal Deficits in a Panel Data Framework 
An alternative technique to the Weighted Least Squares  is the Panel Data analysis, as we 
have temporal series for each canton. Even if this latter technique provides more accurate 
estimations, we find some obstacles to proceed definitively in this direction. We have not all 
the year to year data for all the series. More puzzling is the temporal treatment to give to the 
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 series of fiscal conservatism we have calculated. It has been built up with the voting between 
1979 and 1998. The problem is that, contrarily to all the other series, the single observations 
are far from being periodical. For instance, we have no values for 1982, and only one value 
for 1989. At the opposite, we have 7 values for 1985, 1992, 1994 and 1996. It would be 
necessary to transform the variable in some way. Another difficulty is that voters responses 
are coherent and quite constant in time, but they change substantially from one specific voting 
to the following, even if real preferences remain unchanged. A smoothing transformation 
would be required, weakening the meaning of this variable. Another severe difficulty is that 
we have a measure of relative cantonal conservatism, as it has been elaborated relative to the 
Swiss mean. But we have not the let us call “absolute” value of cantonal preferences. This 
difference is important for the interpretation of results coming from the panel data analysis. 
Finally, as we pointed out in point 3, a limit of RIGUEUR is that it depends on the kind of 
issues voted, that can affect more some cantons than other. This difficulty is avoided if we 
take the mean of the 75 objects submitted to vote, but it appears if we try to propose a time-
variant version of RIGUEUR. We have thus decided to explain the evolution of annual 
cantonal deficits using the same measure of fiscal preferences RIGUEUR applied in the WLS 
framework, that is, we take the arithmetic mean of the 75 voting during the entire period, 
assuming that relative preferences between cantons remain unchanged, which is not a strong 
hypothesis. 
We have selected fundamentally the same variables that in the main econometric model. We 
have operated nevertheless two main transformations. The first one is that the original 
dependent variable DEFCUM, the total amount of requirement of cantonal borrowing, 
becomes DEFICIT, the annual value of the former variable. This transformation is more 
coherent with the panel data framework. The consequent transformation refers to DETTEINI, 
which is no more pertinent when the variable DEFICIT is introduced. We have thus replaced 
it by the lagged value of deficits, that is DEFICIT(-1). In WLS model using mean values it 
was no clear to state which was the sign of the correlation between the initial amount of debt 
and the subsequent accumulation of deficits. Here it can be expected a strong positive 
correlation between actual and one year lagged value of annual deficits. 
We have also explored the possibility to use lagged values of the annual growth rate of 
cantonal income as it can be argued that the effects of economic fluctuations can be felt in the 
public budget one or two years after. We have finally chosen present values, CROISS because 
the introduction of lags diminish the number of periods available for the regression. We have 
tested nevertheless some regressions with lagged values and we obtain similar results 
concerning CROISS and also the other variables. 
Two additional remarks can be pointed out. First, as we are obliged to introduce time-
invariant variables (with different values for each canton) and Auto Regressive terms (AR) 
terms, we eliminate one of the main interest of the Panel Data technique, that is, the 
possibility to estimate fixed effects depending on each individual (the cantons). In fact, this 
limitation is not definitive as we introduce precisely these time-invariant variables to capture 
individual characteristics of the cantons. Also, this model can provide more accurate 
estimations as it counts with the information provided by the time-variant series (among 
them, the explained variable). The second remark is that our specification approaches to the 
lower bound for a judicious use of Panel Data technique, as the number of pooled elements is 
rather exiguous (26 elements), taking into account that we use twelve explanatory variables 
plus a common constant. 
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 Concerning the econometric model, we use DEFICIT as dependent variable. We choose 
common coefficients for all the explanatory variables, as the estimation of cross-section 
specific coefficients is impossible if we introduce several time-invariant variables. One of our 
explanatory variables contains AR terms (DEFICIT(-1)). We assume that there is a common 
AR error for all the cantons. For the intercept, we have selected an identical intercept for all 
pool members, that is, the same constant C for each 26 cantons. As we have said before, we 
cannot estimate fixed effects, that is, a Ci different for each canton, as we have introduced 
time-fixed variables. We ought to renounce also to estimate random effects (i. e. as if Cit were 
random variables across pool members, with Cit = C +ui, E(ui, εit) = 0), because of the 
existence of AR terms. 
We count with two kinds of explanatory variables : four of them are time-variant, that is, we 
have one different observation for each year and for each canton. They are : REVENU, 
CROISS, DEFICIT(-1) and CH. The remaining eight variables are constant over time, but 
logically different among cantons. These are : PARTVILLE, AGRICULT, PARTCANT, 
AGING, DROITE, COALITION, REFEREN, RIGUEUR. 
The length of the model is 15 years, from 1981 to 1995, as we use balanced observations, that 
is, the same periods for all cross-sections. This provides 390 panel observations. 
To establish a parallelism with the WLS specification, we have estimated a second 
specification, giving weights to the observations. As we discussed in point 4 in the main text, 
the presence of heteroskedasticity can be guessed in the presence of individuals having 
significant different size. That is the case for the size of the Swiss cantons, as measured by 
their population. We used this latter variable as weight in the WLS case. In the Panel Data 
framework we ought to use the estimated cross-section residual variances to regress the model 
by Generalized Least Squares (GLS). 
Finally, we proceed as we did before and we rerun a regression of DEFICIT once more, but 
taking only into account the variables that appeared statistically significant in the broad 
specification. 
Table 3 shows the results of the different regressions. 
First column presents the coefficients of the explanatory variables estimated by Pooled Least 
Squares. The second column shows the results of the reduced version, regressing DEFICIT 
only against the variable that were statistically correlated in the precedent model. Columns 
three and four show the results of the GLS estimation with Cross Section Weights and its 
reduced form. 
Of course, we do no go into detail to the interpretation of the results, as it has been made in 
the main text. We refer only to the new outcomes.  
As expected, the strength of the relationship between DEFICIT and DEFICIT(-1) is 
dramatically reinforced compared to the weak relation between DEFCUM and DETTEINI in 
the former model. As we said, the logic behind these two relations is not the same. According 
to the results, more than two thirds of present deficit can be explained by the former year 
level of deficit, the strength of this relationship being high (t-value over 18).  
The level of cantonal income (REVENU) appears to be determinant also, more than its 
variation (CROISS), contrarily what it happened in the WLS case. 
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Table 3 : Estimation of cantonal annual deficits (DEFICIT) 
 Pooled Least squares    GLS (Cross Section Weights)    
  Global 
Model 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
 Reduced 
Model 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
 Global 
Model 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
 Reduced 
Model 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
 
C 388.091 * 464.389 *** 252.3597  328.269 ** 
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  (1.638)  (2.586)  (1.089)  (2.202)  
         
REVENU 0.00536 *** 0.00471 *** 0.00445 *** 0.00403 *** 
 (2.563)  (3.157)  (2.589)  (3.317)  
         
CROISS -6.69481 ** -6.55675 ** -2.462    
 (-2.035)  (-2.055)  (-1.049)    
         
DEFICIT(-1) 0.69637 *** 0.71176 *** 0.68758 *** 0.73108 *** 
 (18.898)  (20.119)  (18.094)  (21.104)  
         
CH  -0.00963    0.01727    
 (-0.551)    (1.018)    
         
AGRICULT 5.60017    6.56446    
 (0.978)    (1.520)    
         
PARTCANT -0.84355    -1.35851    
 (-0.636)    (-1.054)    
         
AGING 9.91225    4.01765    
 (1.258)    (0.566)    
         
PARTVILLE 0.83156    0.92749    
 (0.958)    (1.296)    
         
DROITE 1.08384    -0.25841    
 (0.818)    (-0.244)    
         
COALITION 1.91375    14.9107    
 (0.095)    (0.979)    
         
REFEREN 7.55521    1.73637    
 (0.933)    (0.274)    
         
RIGUEUR -14.6261 *** -11.1266 *** -8.63136 ** -8.47729 *** 
 (-3.085)  (-3.053)  (-2.021)  (-2.813)  
         
     (Unweighted Stats for R2)    
Adjusted R2 0.609  0.612  0.602  0.605  
S.E. of Regres 243.374  242.208  245.438  237.963  
F- Statistic 51.394 *** 154.583 *** 47.918 *** 199.669 *** 
Sum squ. res 22330108  22585873  21866855  23628093  
Notes : In parentheses, the t-student values. * for statistical significance at 10 % level of confidence; ** for 
statistical significance at 5 % level of confidence; *** for statistical significance at 1 % level of confidence. 
 
Among the time invariant series, only the measure of fiscal conservatism RIGUEUR appears 
to be statistically correlated with the level of annual deficits. Accordingly to results, an 
additional point of "fiscal rigorousness" implies between 8.5 and 14.5 francs per inhabitant 
less of annual deficits. This effect is not negligible at all, if we consider that the mean value of 
the annual cantonal deficit (unweighted) is 125.19 francs per inhabitant. 
The sign of the correlation of the other variables remains substantially the same, and this 
relationship is almost significant concerning the variables PARTVILLES and AGRICULT. 
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 In conclusion, even if further consideration can be carried out concerning a better 
specification of the Panel Data model and specially concerning the treatment to give to the 
measure of the evolution of fiscal preferences over time, we confirm the results obtained in 
the standard version WLS. In that way, all the econometric techniques proposed (Weighted 
Least Squares with the square root of population as weight; Weighted Least Squares with 
cantonal population as weight; Pooled Least Squares; and Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
with Cross Section Weights, and all their respective reduced forms) show that the measure of 
fiscal conservatism RIGUEUR is statistically negatively correlated with the level of cantonal 
deficits at least at a 5% interval of confidence. This tends to ensure the plausibility of our 
hypothesis : preferences actually play a role in the explanation of the evolution of public 
deficits at Swiss cantonal level, altogether with other economic, social and political cantonal 
characteristics. 
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 Annex II 
 
Table 4. Summary of data used in the econometric model 
Variable Description Mean St. Dev Min Median Max 
Defcum Summation of annual borrowing 
requirement in current value between 
1970 and 1997, in francs per inhabitant 
 
2247.27 3371.06 -2279.20 817.85 13746.12 
Revenu Mean value of the level of cantonal 
income in 1980 and in 1995, in francs 
per inhabitant 
 
33078.38 6908.78 25306.45 30768.92 54920.65 
Croiss Annual growth rate of cantonal income 
in nominal terms, between 1980 and 
1995, in percentage points 
 
4.46 0.44 3.46 4.47 5.35 
Detteini Nominal value of gross cantonal debt 
in 1980, in francs per inhabitant 
 
4882.83 2273.28 0.00 4231.61 13187.99 
Ch Cantonal revenues coming from the 
central government, in francs pr 
inhabitant. Computed as the mean of 
annual data between 1979 and 1996 
 
1449.46 823.30 613.90 1171.91 4397.31 
Partcant Percentage of the addition of cantonal 
and communal public expenditures 
ensured by the canton. Computed as 
the mean of annual data between 1980 
and 1996 
 
66.99 10.86 54.72 62.92 98.22 
Agricult Percentage of the cantonal production 
done by the primary sector. 1990 data. 
 
5.57 3.54 0.50 5.20 17.60 
Aging Percentage of total resident people 
aged 65 and more. 1990 federal census 
of population data. 
 
14.46 2.01 10.95 14.46 20.09 
Partville Percentage of cantonal population 
living in cities with more than 10'000 
inhabitants. 1997 data 
32.00 25.16 0.00 29.32 99.41 
Droite Percentage of seats at the executive 
branch controlled by center-right 
parties. Mean values between 1979 
and 1998 
 
81.03 11.44 60.00 80.00 100.00 
Coalition Number of parties represented at the 
executive branch. Mean values 
between 1979 and 1998 
 
3.28 0.88 1.00 3.10 5.00 
Referen Dummy variable for cantons having 
compulsory fiscal referenda 
 
0.65 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Rigueur Measure of fiscal conservatism based 
on federal referenda between 1979 and 
1998 
49.70 4.19 38.09 50.35 54.08 
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TABLE 5. Description of voting 
N. votation Date Object Type  Legal Form Pos. CF Conservative attit. Message CF Arrêté Parlem. Colaterals Sample correl Consec. correl 
            
     294 févr.79 Sentiers Exp + IP yes refuse 1977 I 1083 1978 II 901 Mountain 0.309  
297 mai.79 Réforme Icha Tax + OBL yes accept 1978 I 840 1978 II 1827  0.547 0.114 
302 nov.80 Dr. Timbre Tax +  OBL yes accept 1980 I 477 1980 II 633  0.890 0.440 
303 nov.80 Impôt alco Tax +  OBL yes accept 1980 I 477 1980 II 634  0.891 0.988 
304 nov.80 Blé Grant -  OBL yes accept 1980 I 477 1980 II 635 Rural 0.876 0.952 
305 avr.81 Solid étr Exp + IP no refuse 1979 III 605 1980 III 715  0.877 0.767 
308 nov.81 Régime financier Tax + OBL yes accept  1981 I 20 1981 II 545  0.167 0.049 
312 févr.83 Droits de douane Tax +  OBL yes refuse 1982 I 1361 1982 III 109  0.496 -0.123 
313 févr.83 Energie Exp + OBL yes refuse 1981 II 299 1982 III 111  0.527 0.415 
316 févr.84 Tax poids Tax + OBL yes accept 1980 I 1089 1983 II 722 Mountain 0.483 -0.236 
317     févr.84 Vignette Tax + OBL yes accept 1980 I 1089 1983 II 724 Cities 0.776 0.876 
323    déc.84 Maternité Exp + IP no Refuse 1982 III 805 1983 III 1052  0.811 0.459 
324 déc.84 Radio, TV Tax +  OBL yes Refuse 1981 II 849 1984 I 898  0.016 -0.446 
325 déc.84 Victimes Exp -  FAC yes accept 1983 III 901 1984 II 836  0.567 0.691 
326 mars.85 Education primaire sub - OBL yes accept 1981 III 705 1984 II 12  0.799 0.672 
327 mars.85 Santé publique Grant - OBL yes accept 1981 III 705 1984 III 15  0.806 0.974 
328 mars.85 Formation prof Grant -  OBL yes accept 1981 III 705  Unemployment 0.801 0.913 
331 juin.85 Part cantons timbre Tax +  OBL yes accept 1981 III 705 1984 III 16 Centralism 0.689 0.778 
332 juin.85 Répartition Tax alcool Tax +  OBL yes accept 1981 III 705 1984 III 17  0.626 0.975 
333 juin.85 Blé Grant +  OBL yes refuse 1984 I 1281 1984 III 1470 Rural -0.440 0.173 
335 sept.85 Garanties entr Sub + FAC yes refuse 1983 III 497 1984 III 90 Unemployment 0.843 -0.554 
339   sept.86 Culture Exp + IP no refuse 1984 II 521 1986 I 46 Cities 0.671 0.815 
340 sept.86 Form prof Exp + IP no refuse 1984 II 1397 1986 I 856 Unemployment 0.598 0.933 
341 sept.86 Sucre Sub +  FAC yes refuse 1984 II 1420 1985 II 302 Rural 0.418 -0.259 
342 déc.85 Protection locataires Exp +  CP yes refuse 1985 I 1369 1986 I 854 Cities 0.582 -0.139 
343 déc.86 Taxe poids lourds Tax + IP no accept 1985 II 655 1986 II 666 Mountain 0.184 -0.536 
346 avr.87 Référ. pour Exp. militaires Exp - IP no accept 1986 II 481 1987 I 14  -0.672 0.385 
347 déc.87 Rail 2000 Exp (inv)  OBL yes refuse 1986 I 181 1987 I 46  0.267 -0.431 
349 déc.87 Protection marais Exp + IP (CP ind.) no refuse 1985 II 1449 1987 I 969 Rural 0.333 0.354 
350 déc.87 Assurance maladie Exp + FAC yes refuse 1981 II 1069 1987 I 971  0.381 0.457 
351 juin.88 Cadre pol transport Tax + OBL yes accept 1983 I 909 1987 I 964 Mountain/Cities 0.471 -0.448 
352 juin.88 Age retraite Exp + IP no refuse 1985 II 597 1986 III 359  0.754 -0.061 
356 juin.89 Petits paysans Exp + IP no refuse 1988 I 594 1988 III 1409 Rural -0.231 0.308 
363 avr.90 Viticulture Exp +  FAC yes refuse 1989 I 245 1989 II 866 Rural 0.581 -0.535 
367 sept.90 Loi énergie Exp + OBL yes refuse 1988 I 297  1989 III 861  0.212 -0.331 
368 sept.90 Circulation routière Exp +  FAC yes refuse 1986 III 197 1989 III 901 Cities 0.723 -0.092 
370 mars.91 Tr publ Exp + IP no refuse 1989 I 1218 1990 I 868 Cities -0.311 -0.604 
371 juin.91 Loi finances Tax + OBL yes accept 1989 III 1 1990 III 1581  0.591 -0.582 
373 févr.92 Ass-mal supportable Exp - IP no accept 1990 I 1515 1992 III 723  0.149 0.311 
  
           
TABLE 5. Description of voting (cont.) 
N. votation Date Object Type  Legal Form Pos. CF Conservative attit. Message CF Arrêté Parlem. Colaterals Sample correl Consec. 
correl 
 
377 mai.92 Protection eaux Exp + FAC yes refuse 1987 II 1081 1991 I 226  -0.076 -0.006 
381 mai.92 Sauvegarde eaux Exp + IP no Refuse 1987 II 1081 1989 III 859 Mountain -0.048 0.906 
382 sept.92 Train alpin Exp (Inv) + FAC yes Refuse 1991 III 1570 1992 II 1015 Mountain 0.713 0.221 
384 sept.92 Droit timbre Tax - FAC yes Refuse 1991 IV 505 1991 III 1588  0.201 0.591 
386 sept.92 Indemnités parlem Exp + FAC yes Refuse  1991 III 1358  0.461 0.462 
387 sept.92 Infrastr. Partis Exp + FAC yes Refuse  1991 III 1360  0.415 0.986 
389 mars.93 Tax essence Tax + FAC yes Accept 1992 III 341 1992 VI 103 Cities 0.852 0.123 
393 juin.93 Ko avions militaires Exp - IP no Accept 1992 VI 432 1993 I 980  -0.699 -0.496 
397 sept.93 Renchérissement ass mal Exp - FAC yes Accept    0.594 -0.522 
398    sept.93 Assurance-chômage Tax + FAC yes Accept 1993 I 645 1993 I 981 Unemployment 0.635 0.698 
399 nov.93 Régime financier Tax + OBL yes Accept 1992 I 781 1993 II 852  0.406 0.242 
400  nov.93 Assainissement finances Tax + OBL yes Accept  1993 II 850  0.604 0.901 
401 nov.93 Maintien sécu Tax + OBL yes Accept 1992 I 781 1993 II 848  0.482 0.972 
405    févr.94 Vignette Tax + OBL yes Accept 1992 II 725 1993 II 865 Cities 0.743 0.622 
406 févr.94 Taxe poids lourds Tax + OBL yes Accept 1992 II 725 1993 II 863 Mountain 0.638 0.976 
407 févr.94 Tax poids lourds Tax + OBL yes Accept 1992 II 725 1993 III 867 Mountain 0.566 0.992 
410 juin.94 Culture Exp + OBL yes Refuse 1992 I 515 1993 II 845 Cities 0.735 0.017 
413 sept.94 Blé Grant - OBL yes Accept 1993 IV 301 1994 II 222 Rural 0.442 -0.100 
415     déc.94 Lamal Exp + FAC yes Refuse 1992 I 77 1994 II 239  0.840 0.106 
416    déc.94 Ass-mal saine Canton IP no Refuse 1991 IV 961 1993 I 3  0.862 0.945 
418 mars.95 Agriculture compétitive Exp +  CP yes Refuse 1992 VI 284 1994 III 1777  0.659 0.404 
421 mars.95 Frein Exp Exp - OBL yes Accept 1993 IV 301 1994 III 1783  0.298 -0.032 
422 juin.95 Lamal 10 rév Exp -  FAC yes Accept 1990 II 1 1994 III 1784  0.807 0.484 
423 juin.95 Extension AVS Exp + IP no Refuse 1993 II 533 1994 III 1780  0.740 0.763 
425 mars.96 Protection langues Grant + OBL yes Refuse 1991 II 301 1995 IV 451  0.678 0.811 
427 mars.96 Dépenses militaires Exp - OBL yes Accept 1995 I 85 1995 II 349  0.188 -0.381 
428 mars.96 Distilation Grant - OBL yes Accept 1995 I 85 1995 II 350 Rural 0.033 0.879 
429 mars.96 Parkings en gares Grant - OBL yes Accept 1995 I 85 1995 II 351 Cities 0.528 0.569 
430   juin.96 Agriculture Exp + CP yes Refuse 1992 VI 284 1996 I 233 Rural -0.095 -0.547 
431 juin.96 Gover réf Exp + FAC yes Refuse  1993 III 949 1995 IV 454  0.738 0.391 
436 juin.97 Régale poudres Grant - OBL yes Accept 1996 II 1023 1996 V 961  0.382 -0.020 
437 sept.97 Prest. Chômage Exp, Grant - FAC      yes Accept   Unemployment 0.935 0.352
439 juin.98 Frein dette Dette - OBL yes Accept 1997 IV 199 1997 IV 1408  0.898 0.904 
442 sept.98 Redevance poids lourds Tax + FAC yes Accept 1996 V 505 1997 IV 1414 Mountain -0.061 -0.135 
444 Sept.98 Age retraite Exp + IP no Refuse 1997 IV 1406 1997 II 593  0.899 -0.365 
446 Nov.98 Blé, libéraliser Grant - FAC yes Accept 1996 IV 1 1998 2467 Rural -0.072 -0.295 
  
 
